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1. Introduction 
It's typically thought that consequentialists and deontologists are offering competing theories of the 
same thing. But what is that thing? Is it goodness or value 'qua action' (Korsgaard 1996, p. 62; 
Schapiro 2001, p. 99; Katsafanas 2013, p. 61)? 'Acting well' (Muller 2004; Hanser 2008)? The 
'excellent exercise' of 'agency' (Strom 2011, p. 232) or 'practical reason' (Lear 2004, p. 3; Vogler 
2002, p. 29)? One sometimes sees these put forward as the central subject matter of normative 
ethics, but I have trouble imagining many consequentialists going in for this sort of talk. Certainly it 
sticks in my craw. 
Could it be that this language strikes the contemporary ear as forced or high-flown, and as such, 
offends against the aesthetic tastes of your typical self-styled "no-nonsense" consequentialist? That's 
probably part of it. But for me it goes deeper than that. I abjure this kind of talk because I think it 
smuggles in a harmful kind of fetishism. I got into normative ethics because I was bothered that, for 
example, some people were dying of malnourishment while others had foie gras to waste, and that 
the rich and powerful were effectively bribing politicians through campaign contributions. I 
wanted to figure out how to deal with these problems in the best way possible, and I wanted 
arguments that could bring others around to my side. 
And yet I noticed that from some quarters there issued a discourse that was seemingly more 
focused on action and less on the extra-agential world — on 'excellence in the exercise of the 
capacity for rational human agency'…or whatever; on the structure of action; on the explanation of 
action; on the distinction between action and mere behaviour. But what about the whole 'people 
dying' thing? Doesn't that seem more important than winning a gold medal in the Action 
Olympics?  
Look, I'm not completely obtuse. I know that when I write 'deal with these problems', I'm talking 
about acting, and that the kinds of 'arguments' I was searching for concerned the evaluation of 
action. Nobody who wants to make a dent in the world's problems can claim not to care about 
action. Action is the only channel for influencing the world that we can control. And yet, I've long 
had this nagging thought that many philosophers are devoting attention to the category of action 
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that is, somehow, excessive, inappropriate, fetishistic. And it has seemed to me that correcting for 
this would put us in a position to see the deep appeal of consequentialism. 
This paper is an attempt to make these nagging thoughts more precise. 
Here's the gist: The standards by which we evaluate things are not all on equal footing. The 
standard of what we ought, overall, to do stands in a certain kind of evaluative relation to the 
standard of what would be the best football play, or the standard of what would count as the best 
pedagogy. Philosophers have coined a few different labels for this relation. They say the 'all-things-
considered (hereafter: 'ATC') "ought"' standard is more 'robust' (McPherson 2011, p. 233; Cuneo 
2014, p. 155; Finlay 2018) or 'authoritative' (Husi 2011; McPherson 2018) than the 'best football 
play' standard, and that the latter is 'lean' (Cuneo 2014, p. 155) or 'merely formal' (McPherson 
2011, p. 226; Finlay 2018). We would think that someone who guided his conduct by the latter 
standard rather than the former in the event of a conflict would be making a certain sort of 
mistake, over and above the one he'd be making just by falling short of some standard or other. 
We could rightly accuse him of fetishizing the standards of football. 
Well, I want to claim that there's an action-guiding standard that stands to the standard of the ATC 
'ought' as the latter, in turn, stands to the standard of the 'best football play', or to standards of 
etiquette, legality, and the like. It is more authoritative than the standard of the ATC 'ought', or 
indeed any other standard that evaluates action as such, qua action. The standard I have in mind is 
the one we apply when we say it's good or bad, fortunate or unfortunate, that something exists or 
occurs. It's the one we're applying when we say that it would be bad were the Earth to be hit by a 
gamma ray burst, or good if my cold went away. It is way of evaluating things, generally. An action 
is, like anything, a thing, and so we can evaluate actions by this standard, too. We can say, for 
instance, that it was unfortunate that Fred and Mary Trump had intercourse, or that it would be 
good if the action of my calling my wife happened now. It's just that we are not evaluating them 
specifically as actions when we apply this standard. 
I am going to say that actions fare well by this most-authoritative standard insofar as they yield 
good consequences. In this sense, consequentialism is correct. Whether or not consequentialism is 
right account of what we practically ought to do, it's the right theory regarding a standard that 
supersedes or overrides the standard of what we practically ought to do. Someone tho disregarded 
this superseding standard in favour of the standard of the ATC practical 'ought' or that of right 
action one would be, again, guilty of a kind of fetishism. Only here, it's fetishism of the proprietary 
standards of action, rather than those of football. 
I take it that a successful defence of this view will have to show, first, that consequentialism really 
is the correct theory of what meets this standard; second, that this standard really can be action-
guiding; and third, and I think most importantly, that this standard is more authoritative than 
specifically practical standards like that of the ATC practical 'ought'. I'll turn to the third one now. 
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2. What Is 'Authoritativeness'?: In Search of An Answer 
Let me begin by warning you off of an error. To say that one standard is more authoritative than 
another is not to say that it is more fundamental metaphysically, or conceptually, or in the order of 
normative-ethical explanation. For example, one might accept Susan Hurley's (1989) view that 
concepts like 'just' and 'unkind' are prior to those like 'reason', all while thinking that an agent 
who guides her action by an application of 'just' rather than 'reason' in the event of a conflict has 
made an error of practical reasoning. 
Derek Parfit cashes out the distinction between the a 'ought'-standard and those of football and 
law by saying that the former is 'reason-implying' while those like the latter two are merely 'rule-
involving' (2011, p. 144-5). A standard is reason-implying just in case one necessarily has reason 
to do whatever meets that standard. 
Should we think of authoritativeness fundamentally in terms of being reason-implying? I think we 
should not. This is partly because of what I want to say later on about which standards are most 
authoritative — specifically, that a standard that is not obviously reason-implying is nonetheless 
more authoritative than all of the standards that are. But there are other reasons for rejecting a 
Parfit-inspired account. First, it seems to offer no illuminating story of why the standard of what I 
have (some/most/sufficient) practical reason to do is itself authoritative or authority-conferring. That 
standard is reason-implying, of course, but then again the standard of legality is legality-implying. 
It seems that we've done very little to explain why one is more authoritative than the other. 
Moreover, this account is too coarse-grained. As I’ll argue in a moment, there are many grades of 
authoritativeness, and it seems possible for one standard to be more authoritative than another 
despite neither reaching the level of being reason-implying. 
Generally, the strategy of defining the elusive idea of authoritativeness in terms of other evaluative 
or normative concepts strikes me as a mistake. For what we seek is an informative account of why 
standards involving some of these concepts are more authoritative than standards involving others. 
A definition in terms of one or more concepts in this family will be explanatorily shallow. 
So what are the other possibilities? 
We might try to characterize authoritativeness not via definition — in other words, not by the 
inferential role of its concept — but via the concept's non-inferential role. As a starting point, we 
might want to say something like this: The standard of 'ought' or right action is authoritative, while 
the 'good football play' standard is not, because only the former is characteristically linked with 
action. If I think something is right, then under normal conditions, I'll be motivated to at least some 
degree to do it; not so for my thought that something is a good football play. 
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But I have some worries about this. One it that the 'good football play' standard does seem to have 
a special link with motivation. A quarterback in the huddle of a football game might come to think 
'Red 84 would be the best play right now'; that, sans any other evaluation, would be enough to 
make him call out 'Red 84!'. Now, an opponent might think that this appearance is deceiving — 
that either the quarterback also thinks, at some level, that he ought to call Red 84, or else that he 
has some purely contingent desire to call out Red 84. Either way, there is no constitutive link 
between 'best football play' and motivation of the sort that obtains between 'ought' and 
motivation. 
But appearances are surely worth something, and so I'd want to know what countervailing reason 
this opponent has for denying the constitutive link between thoughts about the best football play 
and motivation to act. Additionally, such an opponent will have trouble explaining what makes 
such a thought a normative or evaluative one at all. If 'best football play' or 'illegal' doesn't have a 
constitutive link with motivation, or a similar non-inferential role, it's not clear what puts it on the 
same side of the evaluative/non-evaluative line as 'right' or 'best', rather than on the same side as 
'will create a loud rumble'. 
The non-inferentialist might fix this problem by adopting a more finely-structured account of 
authority and motivation. He can say that both 'ought' and 'best football play' have constitutive 
links with motivation, but they differ in two respects: First, in the event of an apparent conflict 
between what we ATC ought to do and what would be the best football play, it's the role of the 
former that will manifest itself; in other words, we'll tend to do what we think we ought to do. 
Second, thoughts about the best football play will be motivating only in certain contexts — for 
example, that of a football game in which the agent is a player or coach with the expected aims. 
But then what makes a 'best football play' thought evaluative and a 'loud rumble' thought not?  1
Both will motivate sometimes and not others, and both will generally fail to exhibit their 
motivational potential when up against a conflicting 'ought'-thought. Let me float an answer that I 
find plausible, recognizing that it needs further development: The belief that doing A will create a 
loud rumble can play a motivational role, but what it can't do is perform the same kind of 
'silencing' function vis a vis other motivations that I described 'ought'-judgments as doing. By 
contrast, a belief that A is the best football play can perform this function, even if its motivational 
 Some may think that we can draw all these distinctions by adverting to desires: Non-evaluative 1
beliefs can move you only if they are matched up with desires, which may be contingently-held, 
while evaluative beliefs either: (a) don't require desires; (b) generate desires themselves; or else (c) 
move us by matching up with a necessarily-held desire (e.g. the desire to do the right thing). I'm 
resistant to going that way. This is partly because it doesn't seem to help at all with the distinction 
between more-authoritative and less-authoritative evaluative standards. It's also partly because I 
generally don't think that talking about desires does much philosophical-classificatory work. We 
can make all the distinctions we ought to care about just by talking about when someone is moved 
this way or that; the vocabulary of desires functions more as a convenient theoretical overlay. (This 
suggests that the concern about so-called 'moral fetishism' (Smith 1994) is misguided.)
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force is, in turn, silenced by the presence of an 'ought'-judgment. A football player might in some 
circumstances be moved to do A by her thought that this would likely get the team a first down or 
put them in the 'red zone', or that this would be most likely to put points on the board, or that this 
would 'establish the run' and thereby make the 'play action' more effective in this game or in 
future games. But these thoughts would not generally move the player who thought 'but overall, 
this is not the best football play.' The picture lurking behind this distinction is that evaluative 
thought has the function of reconciling, and thereby subsuming, all of the myriad aims and 
aversions that we might have in some context; it's a clearinghouse' for them. By contrast, non-
evaluative thoughts don't have this kind of function. 
But there is a another problem for the non-inferentialist strategy as stated. It doesn't seem to allow 
for mistakes in which standards we take to be authoritative. It holds that standard 1 is more 
authoritative than standard 2 if we would generally be motivated in accordance with the former in 
the event of a conflict. But this seems to work better as an account of what it is for us to take 
standard 1 to be more authoritative than standard 2. We should allow for the possibility that 
someone might take standard 1 to be more authoritative than standard 2 when in fact 2 is more 
authoritative than 1. I'm especially concerned to allow for such mistakes, because one of my main 
claims in this paper is that they're not uncommon. Many of us treat standards like those of the 
practical 'ought' and practical reasons as maximally authoritative, but do so mistakenly. 
The natural fix is to bring in the notion of rational action or the rational agent. We might say that 
our applications of the more authoritative standards are linked up in the aforementioned ways 
motivation only in agents who are practically rational. (See Smith 1994, p. 61) 
Now, I have no quarrel with this characterization. It seems right. But I'll need to go beyond it for 
the purposes of this essay. For I want to convince you that the standard of the good or fortunate 
action is more authoritative than that of right action or the practical 'ought'. I won't be able to do 
this by relying on the premise that the agent who guides her behaviour by the latter at the expense 
of the former is irrational. No one who does not already accept the conclusions of this paper will 
assent to this. 
So I want a deeper account, which does not compete with this rational-motivation-based view but 
rather undergirds it — from which it follows that it really is more rational to go with the apparently 
good action rather than the apparently right one, and therefore that the goodness standard really is 
more authoritative than the rightness or 'ought' standard. 
3. What Is 'Authoritativeness'?: A Deeper Account 
Here's a kind of off-the-cuff take on the difference between the ATC 'ought'-standard, and 
something like the 'best football play' standard: 'The former evaluates action in terms of a broader 
category — action — while the latter evaluates it in terms of a narrower one — football play. The 
"ought"-standard is general, then, while the "football play'" standard is specific.'  
 5
'Broad' vs. 'Narrow'; 'General' vs. 'Specific': I contend that this is the right way of thinking about 
the fundamental difference between more- and less-authoritative evaluative standards. Morality 
seems more general than justice, and justice more general than corrective justice. And the 'more 
authoritative than' relation seems to track that. But as stated, it's imprecise, and easy to shrug off. 
Since I’m going to be putting a lot of argumentative weight on some heterodox views about which 
standards are maximally authoritative, we'll need a more theoretically respectable way of 
supporting these views. Think of what follows as an explication of this hazy, suggestive take on 
authoritativeness. 
The phrase 'all things considered' is a clue. As a first pass, we can say that a standard of evaluation 
is maximally general/broad, and as such, authoritative, if it considers all things; a standard is less 
authoritative if it does not consider all things. An evaluative standard does not consider all things 
when it's constitutive of the concept of that standard that some things are irrelevant to its proper 
application. For example, it seems to be ruled out by the concept 'best football play' that 
considerations unrelated to winning football games bear which football play is best. We can 
reasonably argue about whether 'Red 84' is the better play because it's more likely to put points on 
the board now, or where 'Green 29' is because it will take more time off the clock. But only 
someone who did not understand the concept would sincerely claim: '"Red 84" is the better 
football play because it's more beautiful' or '…because my wife bet money that we would run it' 
or '…because it would contribute to world peace'. Nor does a standard consider all things when 
it's part of the concept that some things are relevant to its proper application — i.e. that some 
things are, of conceptual necessity, ruled in. It's not an 'open question' whether world peace is 
relevant to which is the best football play; but neither is it an 'open question' whether contribution 
to winning the game is. 
By contrast, a standard considers all things if nothing is ruled in or ruled out as relevant by the 
concepts involved. All things are considered, but they're merely considered. 
But now recall that I want to argue that some other standard is more authoritative than even that of 
the ATC 'ought'. It may seem difficult to reach this conclusion, though, if authority is cashed out in 
terms of generality, which is in turn cashed out in terms of how many things are (merely) 
considered. For we're talking about the all-things-considered 'ought'. It would appear to consider 
all things. 
But here I think appearances are deceiving. For the standard of the ATC practical 'ought' is a 
specifically or proprietarily practical standard. So are the standard of right action, the 'practical 
reasons' standard, and perhaps some others. They are not merely ways of evaluating action; they 
are ways of evaluating it qua action, or to borrow a phrase from James, as 'good in the way of' 
action or not. (See Korsgaard, Schapiro, and Katsafanas infra; also Wald 2017, p. 133.) They assess 
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actions as fulfilling or failing to fulfill the function that is associated with the kind: action, and with 
no other kind. 
The meaning of this 'qua' and 'in the way of' are clearer, perhaps, in the case of belief. On the one 
hand, we may evaluate belief qua belief, as good or bad in the way of belief, in terms of the 
function associated with the kind: belief. There's disagreement about how to do this, of course, but 
the consensus among epistemologists is that goodness qua belief is exclusively a matter of things 
like truth, knowledge, evidence, and reliability (and whatever else grounds or conduces to these). 
These are pertinent to whether a belief is fulfilling the function of its particular kind. The fact that a 
holding a belief will make me happier, by contrast, is irrelevant to how it fares by the proprietary 
standards of belief. 
But that's most certainly not because happiness doesn't matter, or because it in no way tells in 
favour of something that it yields happiness. For we may also evaluate a belief as good or bad 
simpliciter in the same way we might evaluate a gamma ray burst or a cold's going away. That 
holding belief makes me happy is obviously relevant to whether it is good in this general way. 
  
That the proprietary standards of belief evaluate it qua belief explains why certain considerations 
are ruled in as relevant and others ruled out as irrelevant. Similarly, I want to claim, the fact that 
the proprietary standards of action evaluate it qua action, rather than simply as good or not 
simpliciter, goes towards explaining why some considerations are ruled in or ruled out. 
Considerations are ruled in if they are germane to the quality of an action as an action — to its 
fulfillment (or not) of the function of the kind: action; they are ruled out if they are not, even if 
they pertain to its quality more generally. 
Now, that in and of itself wont tell us much about right action. But that in combination with other 
theses just might. For suppose we also accepted, with Korsgaard (2009), the claim that action is 
self-constitution, and so action that succeeds qua action is just action that succeeds qua self-
constitution. If we can then show, as Korsgaard believes she can, that only actions that accord with 
the categorical imperative go toward constituting oneself properly, then we'll be led to the 
conclusion that actions are right if and only if they accord with the categorical imperative. Or 
suppose we accept Paul Katsafanas's 'Nietzschean constitutivist' claim that action aims at 'seeking 
and overcoming resistance', and that only those actions that constitute 'a life of continuous 
attainment' will achieve this (2013). Then only such actions will succeed qua action — such that 
they are the right actions, or the ones we practically ought to do. 
There are other ways of using the specifically practical nature of concepts like 'right' to explain 
their application that does not so obviously rely on theories about what constitutes action. Indeed, 
I think that the deontologist implicitly employs them all the time. And it's not hard to imagine a 
situation in which she would make them explicit. Let's say some consequentialist argues as 
follows: '100 people are about to die as the result of a drought. A flood miraculously occurs which 
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ends up saving all of those people, but killing 50 people. Would it be good, or fortunate, overall, 
for that flood to happen? Of course it would! So if an action kills 50 and saves 100, then that 
action is the right action. What's wrong with that?' 
The deontologist would no doubt say — and reasonably so — that evaluations in terms of 
goodness or fortunateness of something's occurring are unlike evaluations in terms of rightness, or 
the practical 'ought, or anything like that: 'We're not asking whether it would be good or fortunate 
were an action to occur that killed 50 and saved 100. We're asking whether that's the right thing to 
do, whether that's what she practically ought to do it.' 
'"Good", "right"…What's the difference? They're all just ways of praising action,' the 
consequentialist might reply. 
'The difference,' the deontologist will say, 'is that when we talk about an action's being right, we're 
evaluating it as an action, not just as just one more kind of event, alongside floods and gamma ray 
bursts. We're not asking whether it's a good thing that's also an action; we're asking whether it's a 
good action.' The more thoughtful deontologist will have some further story about why this 
difference matters; the point here is that she thinks it does matter, for some reason or other. She is 
willing to say one thing about whether it's good that the action occurs, and another about whether 
the action is right, and this is explained by the fact that the 'rightness' standard evaluates action 
qua action, while the goodness standard does not. 
Now, while the senses of 'right' and 'best football play' are doing some work in grounding 
(im)propriety of certain applications of each, respectively, it seems that further claims are 'doing 
more of the work' in determining the proper application of 'right'. After all, it's constitutive of the 
concept 'best football play' that only what's conducive to winning football games is relevant to its 
application. By contrast, almost no one would say that it's part of the sense of 'right' that, e.g., the 
'doing/allowing' distinction is relevant to its proper application. To get the moral significance of 
doing vs. allowing, we'd need some further claims that are not 'contained' in this concept. But as 
we saw above, people do call upon the concept to do some work in delimiting its application: A 
consideration bears on which action is right if and only if it bears on its quality qua action; then 
we need some ethical theory, plus maybe some metaphysical or other philosophical theory, to fill 
in an account of goodness qua action. 
In light of all of this, here's what I'd want to say about authority generally: One standard is more 
authoritative than another just in case the sense of the concept of the former delimits the concept's 
application more than does the sense of the concept of the latter. This is my way of making precise 
the idea that more authoritative standards are somehow broader, more general — that they 
consider, but merely consider, more things. As we saw above, it's intuitive that the concept of the 
best football play delimits its own application more than does that of rightness or the ATC 'ought'. 
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But as I suggested earlier, the concept of goodness does not delimit its own application at all, since 
it does not evaluate actions even qua actions. 
You might ask: 'But doesn't it evaluate actions, and other things, qua things? How does that delimit 
the application of "good" any more than the "qua action" bit delimits the application of "right"?' But 
it's misleading to say 'qua things'. The goodness standard does not evaluate actions not qua 
anything at all. For it is very implausible that anyone, even the most reflective philosopher, is 
asking what makes something good as a thing, makes it exhibit excellence in the way of thinghood 
or thingness, when they ask what would be good to exist or occur.  2
  
What's to be said, then, in favour of my view about authoritativeness? 
First, it seems to give us the right answers in the obvious cases. It implies that the 'rightness' 
standard is more authoritative than the 'best football play' or 'best pedagogy' standard. It implies 
that the standard of morality generally is more authoritative than the standard of justice 
specifically. It implies that the standard of ATC practical reasons enjoys a good deal of authority 
relative to many other standards — and unlike a story on which being authoritative just is being 
reason-implying, it explains why that is. 
Second, it accounts for the conclusion of section 2, for which we were seeking some explanation 
— that in the event of an apparent conflict between more authoritative evaluations and less 
authoritative ones, rationality requires that we guide our conduct by the former. The story goes like 
this: The sense of the concept of a less authoritative standard rules in or rules out certain 
considerations. And so it motivates only it's tokened in a context in which I have taken for granted 
certain ends or aversions — namely, only when I have ends or aversions which are linked up in the 
right way with what the concept's sense has ruled in as relevant, and has not ruled out as 
irrelevant. For example, since the concept 'the best football play' rules in anything related to 
winning football games as relevant and rules out anything else, it gets a rational-motivational 
purchase on me in contexts in which I aim to win a football game, and not elsewhere. But now 
think of what happens when we so much consider a more authoritative standard — e.g. when we 
wonder: 'Yes, A is the best football play, but what should I do?' This seems to have the effect of 
wiping out 'best football plays''s motivational niche. I stop taking for granted those ends and 
aversions that are relevantly related to what's constitutively ruled in by that concept, and may 
adopt ends and aversions that had been ruled out. Now motivation by this standard looks irrational 
because, to put it simply, I don't care about anything that the standard had designated as 
important, and now care about many things it had designated as unimportant. The rational thing to 
 Some artists and art critics do speak of thingness, but it's clear they have a different notion in 2
mind than I do. Johanna Drucker writes:'[T]the concept of 'thingness' links sculpture to objects in 
and of the world in a combination of [art] and mass culture production. Thingness embraces the 
specificity and allusional properties of material…' (1997, p. 157).
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do is to act on the more authoritative standard, the few rulings-in of which correspond to my new 
ends and aversions, and the few rulings-out of which do not. 
Third, my theory of authoritativeness explains why following less-authoritative standards in these 
conflict cases is not just irrational, but is mistaken in this deeper, 'fetishising' way, too. The thought 
is that the way we get around the world should be dictated, to the maximum possible extent, by 
the world. Maybe it's my pleasures and pains and those of others that, ideally, would direct my 
actions; maybe it's my will and the wills of others; maybe my attachments play a role. But the 
purest way of responding to the world is to favour some of these and disfavour others, just on 
account of the features themselves. Less authoritative standards put something in the way — the 
extra constitutive content of the concepts of those standards. When I do an action because it is 
optimal qua football play or pedagogy, I am moved to do it not only by the action, its 
consequences, my preferences, others' wills, and so forth, but by the fact that the concept I'm 
employing in evaluating this action has a certain constitutive structure — one that rules in some 
things as relevant to its applications, and rules out other things as irrelevant. That's not to deny that 
it's often useful or enlivening to guide one's behaviour by less-authoritative concepts. (Part of the 
story here would be akin to the one Michael Bratman tells about why it's worthwhile to make and 
follow plans.) But there is some kind of shortcoming we're exhibiting when we do that; we're 
falling short of an ideal of guiding ourselves by unblinkered, pure evaluation. 
4. Why Consequentialism is the Correct Theory of Good or Fortunate Action 
Reasonable people disagree about whether consequentialism is the correct theory of right action. 
It’s not obvious. But I do think it’s obvious that consequentialism of a certain sort is the correct 
account of when it's good for a thing to exist, for an event to occur, and for a fact to obtain. It 
follows that consequentialism of this sort is the correct theory of which actions are good, of when 
it's fortunate that some action occurs, since an action is — whatever else it is — a kind of thing or 
event. According to this sort of consequentialism, what makes a thing good are the past, present, 
and future consequences of its existing, occurring, or obtaining. These include the consequences 
that inhere in its very existing, occurring, or obtaining. 
This sort of consequentialism holds that, all else being equal and in conjunction with other 
plausible claims, it would be fortunate for a weather event to occur that kills a few people, but 
saves more from dying from a drought-induced famine. Correspondingly, it would seem to hold 
that it would be fortunate for an action to occur that had the same basic causal profile. 
But perhaps that’s too hasty. 'If all you can show is that consequentialism is the correct account of 
the "good action" standard,' some might respond, 'then you haven’t gotten very far. There are good 
reasons to think that any plausible moral theory can be represented as a form of consequentialism 
(Portmore 2007). To get the results you seem to want, you’d need to show that the correct form of 
consequentialism about goodness/fortunateness is the agent- and time-neutral version that the 
untutored think of when they think "consequentialism".' 
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This is a pretty big-picture paper, so I don’t pretend to have a decisive reply. I will say this, though: 
However plausible deontology is as a theory of the right, and however interesting it is to try to see 
if we can 'consequentialize' deontology, the theory of the good that forms part of 
consequentialized deontology is just not a plausible theory of the good. Whether or not you favour 
a 'fitting-attitude' analysis of 'good', we can take the fittingness of attitudes as, at the very least, 
evidence of what’s good. And to that end, it just seems strange, unfitting, for me to prefer, ceteris 
paribus, a world in which six people are killed to a world in which five are killed. (See also 
Schroeder 2007) 
Less drastic than full-fledged 'consequentialized deontology' is something like what Robert Nozick 
(1974, p. 30) termed a 'utilitarianism of rights'. An adherent of this view might argue: 'You seem to 
be counting only the causal profile of an action in its "consequences". But surely one of the 
consequences of my doing an action is that that very action is done. But the state of affairs in 
which some people die because of a killing is worse than the state in which the same number of 
people die due to something non-agentive — a gamma ray burst, a spasm, and so on.'  
Well, I’m not so attracted to the idea that, ceteris paribus, a killing adds any disvalue over and 
above that produced by the death it brings about. But even if it does, even if a 'utilitarianism of 
rights' is correct and value of 'the act itself’ figures into the value of its own consequences, this is a 
far cry from deontology as most people understand it. Of course this was Nozick's point in 
introducing this theory. Most obviously, this view will permit, ceteris paribus, killing N people as a 
means of preventing the killing any number greater than N. And so my argument in this paper still 
cuts serious ice in normative ethical debates. 
On top of its other merits, my version of consequentialism helps us to revitalize a kind of criticism 
of non-consequentialism that seems very compelling at first but typically withers upon 
examination. Some consequentialists like to say that deontologists fetishize the purity of their own 
agency. They're willing to accept the worse outcome so long as it means that they themselves can 
avoid acting wrongly (See Williams 1981, p. 50). The reasonable response from the deontologists is 
to say, 'Look, we’re all talking about right action here; so insofar as I’m guilty of fetishizing my own 
agential purity or some such, so are you. You also care about acting well, about excellent rational 
agency. We just disagree about what that consists in.' But someone who guides her behaviour by 
the kind of consequentialism I’m proposing here is not exhibiting such a concern. She can regard 
the deontologist — and for that matter, the textbook consequentialist — as fetishizing agency and 
'acting well' insofar as he insists on guiding his behaviour by less-authoritative, specifically 
practical standards. This criticism of the deontologist would be like the criticisms that most of us 
would level at someone who couldn’t help but make decisions from the narrow standpoint of what 
would make him a good soldier, a good teacher, a good party host. 
5. Some Precedent for My View 
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I am not the first person to have observed that some ways of looking at action are more amenable 
to consequentialism and some to deontology. Korsgaard and Talbot Brewer, both opponents of 
consequentialism, have sought to locate its appeal in a certain conception of action — a 
conception that they then attack in the expectation that this will undercut consequentialism's 
appeal. Korsgaard writes: 
  
 'According to Mill, action is essentially production, and accordingly its function is to  
 bring something about. Whether an action is good depends on whether what it brings  
 about is good, or as good as it can be. The influence of this conception of action on  
 contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy has been profound. Nowadays even  
 moral philosophers who are not utilitarians appear to be comfortable only if they can  
 explain moral value in terms of the production of various goods and harms. Deontological  
 considerations are sometimes characterized as “side-constraints,” as if they were   
 essentially restrictions on ways to realize ends. As such, they have been found mysterious  
 by many philosophers. If the whole point of action is to produce the good, how then can it  
 be good to restrict that production?' (2009, p. 8) 
And here’s Brewer, discussing the 'dogmas of desire' that he regards as part of a general “world-
making” conception of agency: 'On close inspection…it turns out that the dogmas of desire are 
integral elements of a substantive vision of ethics — a vision at once worldly, progressive, and anti-
contemplative.' (2009, p. 8) Later, he suggests that the 'production-based' view of action seems to 
lend support to 'the prevailing idea that the proper practical response to the good is always to 
promote it, and where possible to bring about more rather than less of it'” (2009, p. 235) 
Obviously, I think Korsgaard and Brewer are onto something, and one can't help but applaud any 
attempt to get at the deep roots of a view one opposes, rather than play about on the surface. But 
it's important to see that these critics are saddling the consequentialist with a particularly 
metaphysical spin on the broad idea that we think of action in terms of production, or bringing 
things about. On their telling, the consequentialist believes that action is production, just as one 
might believe that the statue is the clay or pain is C-fibres firing. The consequentialist is presented 
as engaging in an action-theoretic project of the sort I mentioned in the introduction. 
But I, for one, don't think action is production. I don't have any view about what action is, other 
than to say that it is a thing — as everything is — and that it can be productive; it can bring things 
about. Mine is an value-theoretic precisificatoin of the same broad outlook. Whether or not action 
is production, it's mostly what an action produces that makes it good or not if it occurs, because 
it's mostly what things in general produce that makes it good or not if they occur. And evaluation 
in terms of this general goodness or value — a kind of evaluation that we can make of any thing 
whatsoever — is more authoritative than the kind of evaluation that applies to actions specifically, 
qua actions. 
 12
I discuss Korsgaard and Brewer here partly to emphasize this difference between the metaphysical 
and value-theoretic spins on the picture of action as crucially involving production. But I also raise 
it to quell the suspicion that the 'nagging thoughts' I expressed in the introduction were just me 
imagining things. Two of the most searching philosophers on 'the other side' have also noticed that 
consequentialists and deontologists, far from simply holding different views about the very same 
thing, seem to have different conceptions of the very subject matter of ethics. And both of them 
seem to agree with me that a satisfactory resolution of the debate about consequentialism will rest 
largely on a determination of which of these conceptions is correct. 
6. Objections and Responses 
Right Answers in Ethics? 
It be be objected: 'You say that a standard is more authoritative the less the concept of it delimits 
its application. But then it becomes unclear how there can be correct or incorrect ways of applying 
these more-authoritative standards. Consider that Korsgaard and Katsafanas can claim to derive 
their normative conclusions only because they're applying a standard that judges actions qua 
actions. For they can claim without too much implausibility that action has a constitutive aim, or a 
telos. You can't say the same thing about things simpliciter. Nothing's constitutive of being a thing 
— other than existing, I suppose. But even if we put aside these constitutivists, there just seems to 
be a deficit of objectivity when you're starting with such thin evaluative concepts. Sense, after all, 
determines reference. Concepts like "best football play" have lots of sense, so it's no trouble to see 
how they refer. And the clever theorist can eek some sense out of "right" or the practical "ought". 
But "good" simpliciter seems to have virtually none.' 
  
This is worth taking seriously. It presents us with a dilemma of a sort that we see over and over in 
ethics: If a mode of evaluation is too thick, then it is merely parochial, unimportant, readily 
ignorable. But if a mode of evaluation is too thin, then it is unclear how it can have conditions of 
correctness or incorrectness. Many philosophers are quick to declare of Korsgaard, Katsafanas, 
Velleman, and other constitutivists that they're packing much too much into action or the concept 
thereof — that action as such is really just an exercise of will, and that's it; nothing more to say. 
But the constitutivists are putting their robust conceptions of action to a certain use — they're 
trying to provide what we might loosely term a foundation for ethics. Their critics had better either 
offer a foundation of their own, accept the skeptical consequences of not having one, or show how 
we we can have right answers in the absence of one. 
Without belabouring the point, let me simply say that I opt for the third strategy. In other work, I 
offer a quietist meta-ethical view on which ethics can be objective even in the absence of 
'foundations' derived from metaphysics, semantics (to which would belong claims about a 
concept's sense or constitutive structure), or the theory of practical rationality.  The basic idea is 
that the debates we care about in normative ethics are much like what get called 'merely verbal' or 
'non-substantive' disputes, like James's case of the two hikers arguing about whether the man is 
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going ''round the squirrel' (1907). They afford none of the values that inhere in correct prediction, 
in action that tends to bring about the general satisfaction of our desires, or in accurate 
representation of the world in any robust sense of the phrase. But the results of metaphysics, 
semantics, or the theory of rationality could bear on these debates, I claim, only by bearing on 
which beliefs have or promote these values. And so these fields are irrelevant to the question of 
which, if any, ethical views to adopt or which to jettison. The only grounds for going one way or 
other in ethics are specifically ethical grounds, which one can apprehend only from within an 
ethical-evaluative standpoint. (Sepielli ms) 
Is The "Most Authoritative" Standard Practical? 
Perhaps you've been struck by this thought: 'Your suggestion is that we guide our actions by this 
more authoritative "goodness" standard, rather than by a less authoritative "rightness" or "practical 
reasons" standard. But perhaps you are asking for the impossible. After all, how can a standard that 
evaluates everything from sneezes to spasms, earthquakes to gamma ray bursts, the existence of 
God to the non-existence of the perfect mousetrap, serve as a direct basis for action, given that the 
evaluation of these other things can’t lead to action?' 
I have two responses. First, I reject the idea lurking in the background that we can only be moved 
to action by evaluations of action. Suppose a waiter's question 'Soup or salad?' prompts you to 
evaluate the two items, and conclude that the soup is better. It seems that this conclusion is 
sufficient to rationalize your speech-act of replying 'Soup, please!'. I see no good reason to think 
that such an evaluation can render action intelligible only via an intermediate evaluation of the 
speech acts: saying 'soup' and saying 'salad'. This seems to me to exemplify a more general 
phenomenon — that we can be moved to actions by our choices even when the objects of those 
choices are not themselves actions. 
Why might someone deny this? Perhaps it's because an exercise of the will can’t by itself bring 
about the appearance of either the soup or the salad. I need some help from the outside world, 
including from other people. Insofar as we acquire the soup or salad, we can only get them by 
engaging in something that is entirely controllable by the will — here, asking for one of the items. 
But the idea that we can only be moved to action by choosing among things that the will can 
control all by itself, with no help from the rest of the world, has implausible consequences. It 
implies that even action-evaluations can move us to act only if they are evaluations of so-called 
'basic' actions — actions that you don’t do by doing anything else, or that you can be practically 
certain you’ll manage to pull off (Danto 1965). But most things we’d think of as ordinary actions 
are not basic; they can’t happen without help from the unruly world to supplement the input from 
our wills. However, it does seem that by deciding on some non-basic action, I can impel myself to 
perform more proximate actions. I can conclude that I ought to open the front door, and start 
acting based on that conclusion; I’m not limited to choosing among actions like rotate my hand 
slightly to the right while squeezing the doorknob, and praying that this gets me what I want. 
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With that said, I grant that evaluations of outcomes and objects can’t always impel me to act. 
Notably, they can’t do it in cases where other considerations are salient. For example, an ordinary 
person contemplating what he practically ought to do in the 'fat man' version of the trolley 
problem will not be impelled to rational action simply by the thought that five dead is worse than 
one dead. It does seem that, in some cases, the objects of our evaluation must be actions 
themselves, not just the products of action. 
But does that spell doom for the action-guidingness of the 'goodness' standard? Hardly. We need 
to distinguish sharply between the matter of what’s evaluated in some situation, and that of which 
standard is being used to evaluate those things in that situation. Suppose it's right that I can reach 
an action-guiding conclusion in some situation only by evaluating all and only the actions that are 
possible for me in that situation. It does not follow from this that the kind of evaluation to which I 
subject these actions must be an evaluation of them qua actions. 
We can put this point another way. Elijah Millgram has coined a clever name, 'Intendo', for the 
practice of agency generally: 'Intendo is the game you are playing whenever you do anything at 
all; "agent" is thus the generic role in the generic game (the analog of "player" in chess or 
baseball).' (Millgram 2005). Insofar as the exercise of agency is, in a certain sense, inescapable, 
this game of Intendo is inescapable; it’s one we all must play, all the time. It doesn’t follow from 
this alone that we have to assess moves in Intendo by the standards of Intendo, any more than we 
must assess moves in Nintendo by the standards of Nintendo. (Surely I'm not the only one who 
often placed more value on exploring the strange world of Super Mario Brothers 2 than on winning 
the game.) 
I think the failure to appreciate this distinction between what’s evaluated and how it’s evaluated is 
one reason why the uber-standard of goodness or fortunateness, which exhibits such supersessory 
power in my own mind, seems not to do so in the minds of most other people. Ordinarily, we’re 
accustomed to 'reading off' the appropriate standard of evaluation in a context from our 
conception of the things we’re evaluating in that context. A coach in a football game is evaluating 
prospective football plays, and is thinking of them as football plays. It is very natural, then, to 
evaluate them qua football plays — that is, by criteria the relevance of which is explained by kind-
concept that figures in the mode of evaluation. Similarly, then, I think it is very natural when the 
things one is called upon to evaluate are actions, and only actions, to read off the standard of 
evaluation from this — and so to evaluate them by standards that are proprietary to action. So in a 
way, I’m asking you to do something that always feels a bit funny — i.e. to evaluate X’s, and only 
X’s, by standards that apply to a much broader range of things. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
I have tried to present at least a presumptive case for a certain form of consequentialism. If the 
major moves are right — i.e. that this standard being both maximally authoritative and practical — 
 15
then I think the kind of consequentialism I’m pushing is on firmer ground than is consequentialism 
as a theory about what we practically ought to do. 
Is it a new form of consequentialism? I’m not so sure. Certainly most present-day consequentialists 
do frame their theory as a response to the question of 'What ought I to do?' But perhaps they’re 
using the language of 'ought' to talk about whichever standard for evaluating action is thinnest and 
most authoritative — which, if I’m right, is the standard of goodness/fortunateness. It would be 
revealing to learn how other consequentialists respond to explications of the practical 'ought' 
concept in which its status as an evaluation of action qua action is made specific. My own 
response to talk of 'acting well' and 'excellent rational agency' has always been to think, 'Who 
cares? I’m a lot of things — a thinker, a feeler, Dasein, a nexus of causal forces; what is the special 
significance of being a good, or "excellent", agent?' This suggests that I, at least, hadn’t been taking 
action-specific evaluation to be maximally authoritative in the first place. 
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